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Abstract
This Essay does not focus on the feasibility of an European Community (”EC”) civil code,
but rather addresses questions of substance relating to the law of obligations, that is, the law of
contract and tort, leaving aside the law of property and family law. Nevertheless, I must state that
I do not believe in the feasibility of a uniform Civil Code for the European Community. Rather
than employing legislation as the means of bringing about uniformity, I prefer discovering general
principles common to statutes and case law of European Union Member State legal systems, as
influenced and brought closer to each other, but not justified, by case law from the European Com-
munity (’EC’) and the European Convention Human Rights judiciary. For indeed, the European
Community courts, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or “Court”), and the European Court of
First Instance (“ECFI”) will not result in the unification of national private laws. Similar to the
impact of EC directives on private law, the impact of ECJ case law on private law will only be
piece-meal; that is, only visible in some limited fields of private law, and will tend to harmonize,
rather than to unify, the national rules in those fields. Therefore, ECJ case law will never lead to
any kind of a coherent statutory unification of contract law.
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INTRODUCTION THE ECJ'S ROLE IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF COMMUNITY LAW
This Essay does not focus on the feasibility of an EC civil
code, but rather addresses questions of substance relating to the
law of obligations, that is, the law of contract and tort, leaving
aside the law of property' and family law. Nevertheless, I must
state that I do not believe in the feasibility of a uniform Civil
Code for the European Community. Rather than employing leg-
islation as the means of bringing about uniformity, I prefer dis-
covering general principles common to statutes and case law of
EU Member State legal systems, as influenced and brought
closer to each other, but not justified, by case law from the Euro-
pean Community and the European Convention Human Rights
judiciary.' For indeed, the European Community courts, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court"), and the European
* Mr. van Gerven is a Professor at the Universities of Leuven and Maastricht and a
former Advocate General at the European Court ofJustice. A version of this Essay will
appear in Chapter 8 of an upcoming book entitled, TowARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE.
1. In Spain v. Council, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") held that the Euro-
pean Community has the jurisdiction to promulgate substantive law provisions relating
to property law. Case C-350/92, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1985. This is so despite Article 222 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") which requires, "[t]his
Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in member-States governing the system of
property ownership." Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art.
222, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 711 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719,
31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-11) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act,
O.J. L 169/1 (1987), (1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TRE.A-Es ESTABLISH-
ING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrIES (EC OfT'l Pub. Off. 1987). Whether that includes the
competence for the European Community to change the national property laws drasti-
cally is, in my view, unlikely. See S. Bartels, Europees privaatrecht: over de bevoegdheidsverdel-
ing tussen Unie en LidStaat met betrekking tot het eigendomsrecht, ARs AEQui 244 (1995).
2. See Walter van Gerven, The Case-law of the European Court of Justice and National
Courts as a Contribution to the Europeanisation of Private law, 3 EUR. REv. PRIVATE L 367,
375-78 (1995).
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Court of First Instance ("ECFI")3 will not result in the unifica-
tion of national private laws. Similar to the impact of EC direc-
tives on private law, the impact of ECJ case law on private law will
only be piece-meal; that is, only visible in some limited fields of
private law, and will tend to harmonize, rather than to unify, the
national rules in those fields.4 Therefore, ECJ case law will never
lead to some kind of a coherent statutory unification of contract
law.
Before assessing the impact of ECJ case law on the law of
contract and tort, it may be useful to briefly describe the role
which the ECJ plays in cooperation with national courts in the
framework of the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in
Article 177 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty").' The role of Article 177 is mainly to interpret
primary and secondary Community law. Insofar as the Court's
interpretation bears on EC Treaty provisions and provisions of
regulations, that is, on provisions which are fully binding and
uniform in all Member States, it assures uniformity in the appli-
cation of such rules throughout the European Community.
When the interpretation, however, bears on provisions of direc-
tives which are only achieving uniformity as to the result pursued
by the directive but not with respect to the form and methods to
be used by the Member States,' the ECJ's interpretation will only
bring about uniformity in the interpretation of the concepts and
principles contained in the directive and, eventually, taken over
literally in the implementing national legislation. It will not be
able to assure uniformity in the interpretation of the implement-
ing national rules themselves, as those remain within the juris-
diction of the Member States.
3. The European Court of First Instance ("ECFI") was established in Article 168a
of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 168a, 1 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685-86.
The ECFI is attached to the Eq and has the "jurisdiction to hear and determine at first
instance... certain classes of action or proceeding ... [but cannot] hear and deter-
mine questions [regarding] a preliminary ruling under Article 177." Id. Reference to
the Community courts or judiciary is a reference to both courts.
4. See THOMAS WILHELMSSON, SociAL CoNTRACT LAW AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
89-101 (1994); Thomas Wilhelmsson, European Contract Law Harmonization: Aims and
Tools, TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 23, 25-29 (1993).
5. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689; see generally Carl Otto
Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 18 FoRDHA INT'L L.J.
388, 388-409 (discussing purpose and function of preliminary ruling procedure in EC
law).
6. See EC Treay, supra note 1, art. 189, 3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693.
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It should be pointed out that ECJ case law concerning the
interpretation of provisions of directives and of regulations is
often of a more limited nature than ECJ case law concerning EC
Treaty provisions and general principles, including those relat-
ing to the direct effect of directives, the requirement of directive
conform interpretation, and the principle of liability for non-im-
plementation of directives.7 Whereas the ECJ's interpretation of
EC Treaty provisions and, even more so, of the underlying gen-
eral principles is frequently bold, or even audacious, that is nor-
mally not the case of the ECJ's interpretation of specific directive
provisions which is, more often than not, of a rather textual na-
ture relating, as it usually does, to precise and often technical
expressions.' A recent example of such textual interpretation is
the Panagis Pafitis9 decision concerning Article 25 of Directive
77/91 (the "Second Company Directive"). 1  In that decision,
the Court held that Article 25 "precludes national legislation
under which the capital of a bank constituted in the form of a
public limited liability company [which, as a result of its debt
burden, is in exceptional circumstances] may be increased by an
administrative measure, without a resolution of the general
meeting." 1 By doing so, the ECJ gave absolute precedence to
the provisions of the Second Company Directive which require
the approval of the shareholders' meeting for an increase of cap-
ital with the objective of reorganizing a bank which is in finan-
cial trouble in favor of the bank's creditors, namely small deposi-
tors. Indeed, if the increase of capital imposed by the national
banking supervisory authority, in that case the Bank of Greece,
7. See, e.g., M.H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health
Authority (Teaching), Case C-152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688;
Marleasing S.A. v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion S.A., Case C-106/89,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-4135, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 305; Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6/90
and C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 66 [hereinafter Francovich I].
8. There are situations in which the ECJ displays bold interpretation techniques
also in regard of directive provisions, namely when those are, like in the field of equal
treatment of men and women in the social field, based on fundamental Community
concepts or freedoms. See, e.g., Walter van Gerven et al., Current Issues of Community Law
Concerning Equality of Treatment Between Women and Men in Social Secunty, in EQUALrrY OF
TREATMENT BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN IN SOCIAL SECURITY 7 (C. McCrudden ed., 1994)
(detailing ECJ interpretation techniques in respect to social security benefits).
9. Case C-441/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1347.
10. See Council Directive No. 77/91, OJ. L 26/1 (1977). This Directive concerns
the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration
of their capital. Id.
11. Panagis Pafitis, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-1380, 60.
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in accordance with domestic law has to be approved by the old
shareholders, it is possible that no reorganization will take place
or, if it does, will come too late. The Court based its decision on
a textual interpretation of the Second Company Directive and
on its previous case law, setting aside arguments drawn from ex-
isting or proposed, Community legislation with respect to credit
institutions' 2 as well as arguments relating to the cohesion of the
national banking supervisory systems which contain a closed sys-
tem of provisions designed to preserve public confidence in the
financial structure and to protect depositors. The Court-did not
even try to balance the underlying and conflicting interests of
shareholders and depositors as it might have done when dealing
with the interpretation of Treaty provisions.13 Whatever the
merit of the solution created by the Court, the method of text
abiding interpretation followed by the Court in that case seems
typical for the Court's attitude when it is asked to interpret pre-
cise wording in directives or regulations. It is in sharp contrast
with some of the Court's case-law relating to the interpretation
of basic EC Treaty provisions and of general principles which the
Court reads in, or deduces from, the general structure and fea-
tures of the Community legal order.
I. THE HARMONIZ1NG EFECT OF ECJ CASE LAW IN THE
FIELD OF LEGAL REMEDIES: THE FA CTORTAME
JURISPRUDENCE
An example of a field of Community law in which the case-
law of the ECJ displays a great deal of creativity as it relates to the
interpretation of EC Treaty provisions in light of general princi-
ples of Community law is the case-law regarding the requirement
of an effective judicial protection. That the legal systems of the
Member States must provide remedies of ajudicial nature to se-
cure individuals effective protection for the rights which they de-
rive from Community law is indeed a principle of Community
law which the ECJ has gradually developed. As a result, it is for
12. Id. at 1-1372, 27.
13. Id. at 1-1377, 1 46. The defendants in the national proceedings specifically
relied on the Eq's judgments in Hanns-Martin Bachmann v. Belgian State, Case C-
204/90, [1992] E.C.R 1-249, and Commission v. Belgium, Case C-300/90, [1992] E.C.R.
1-305, where the ECJ addressed the interpretation of fundamental EC Treaty provisions
and acknowledged the need to recognize the cohesion of a closed system of national
rules in the field of taxation.
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the national courts to disapply any national rule of whatever na-
ture or importance which might jeopardize such legal protec-
tion.
A striking example of the effect which the requirement of
effective judicial protection may have on the legal system of a
Member State is offered by The Queen v. Secretary of State for Trans-
port, ex parte: Factortame Limited ("Factortame F).'1 There, the ECJ
held that a national court should set aside a national rule if that
rule is the sole obstacle to granting interim relief to a citizen
who claims that a national measure, in that case an Act of Parlia-
ment, is threatening to jeopardize the rights which he derives
from Community law. 5 The national rule precluding interim
relief was:
the old common law rule that an interim injunction may not
be granted against the Crown, that is to say against the gov-
ernment, in conjunction with the presumption that an Act of
Parliament is in conformity with Community law until such
time as a decision on its compatibility with the law has been
given. 16
In Factortame I, national legislation was at stake which the
ECJ, in Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame
Ltd. ("Factortame IT), held violated directly applicable EC Treaty
provisions.17
Later, in Zuckerfabrik Suderdithmarschen A.G. v. Hauptzollamt
and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Paderbon,II the Court
extended its ruling to a situation where a national administrative
measure implementing a Community regulation was challenged
before a national court on the ground that the regulation was
invalid for conflicting with general principles of Community law.
The Court held:
The interim legal protection which Community law ensures
14. The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, exparte Factortame Ltd., Case C-
213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 [hereinafter Facortame 1].
15. Id. at 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 1.
16. Id. at 2474, 23, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 30.
17. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport expane Factortame Ltd., Case C-221/
89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3905, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589 [hereinafter Factortame I]; see also Com-
mission v. United Kingdom, Case C-246/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4585.
18. Zuckerfabrik Suderdithmarschen A.G. v. Hauptzollamt and Zuckerfabrik Soest
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn, Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, [1991] E.C.R.
1415.
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for individuals before national courts must remain the same,.
irrespective of whether they contest the compatibility of na-
tional legal provisions with Community law or the validity of
secondary Community law, in view of the fact that the dispute
in both cases is based on Community law itself."
The Court, however, did not stop there. Observing that na-
tional legal orders grant interim relief under differing condi-
tions, the Court stressed the need to secure the uniform applica-
tion of Community law, "a fundamental requirement of the
Community legal order."20 Following that remark, the Court de-
scribed the substantive conditions for the granting of interim re-
lief which must be equally applicable in all Member States and,
thus, equally applied by all national courts. To do that, the
Court took as a starting point the criteria which it uses when it
exercises its own suspensory power under Article 185 of the EC
Treaty with respect to Community measures," thus, harmoniz-
ing the two sets of Community based legal rules on interim re-
lief.
Following the Factortame Ijudgment, the English House of
Lords granted interim relief in the underlying case and sus-
pended the Act of Parliament which threatened to jeopardize
the Community rights of the plaintiffs in the national proceed-
ings.22 The consequence of both the ECJ and the House of
Lords jurisprudence in the Factortame judgments was, however,
that individuals deriving rights from Community law were, in the
19. Id. at 541, 20. That since the ECJ's judgment in Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt
Lubeck-Ost, Case C-314/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4199, the invalidity of secondary Community
law can only be decided at the occasion of preliminary proceedings by the Court it-
self, does not, the Court said in Zuckerfabrik, "preclude the power of national courts to
suspend enforcement of a national administrative measure adopted on the basis of a
Community regulation." Id. at 541, 1 21. Such suspension may, however, only be or-
dered if the national court is persuaded that "serious doubts exist as to the validity of
the Community regulation" and provided that the suspension retains the character of
an interim measure, meaning that it may apply "only until such time as the Court has
delivered its ruling on the question of validity." Id. at 542, 23-24.
20. Id. at 542, 26.
21. See Walter van Gerven, Bridging the Gap Between Community and National Laws:
Toward a Principle of Homogeneity in the Field of Legal Remedies?, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
679, 685-86 (1995). The Zuckerfabrik ruling was confirmed by the ECJ in Atlanta
Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesamt fur Emahrung und Forstwirtschaft,
where the Court indicated that measures of interim relief may also include positive
action. Case C-465/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3761, 3792-93, 39-45.
22. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex pane Factortame Ltd., (1990] 3
C.M.L.R. 375, 406 (H.L. 1990).
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United Kingdom, better protected than individuals deriving
rights from national law. Indeed, by virtue of Community law,
an interim injunction could be granted, even against the Crown,
when Community rights of individuals were in danger. Interim
relief could not be granted in purely national law matters, how-
ever, despite that the rights of individuals may be impaired as
much in those matters. To remedy that potential situation, the
House of Lords granted interim relief against the Crown also in
purely English law situations in a later judgment.23
The foregoing illustrates three points. First, it demonstrates
that Community law may have the effect that important national
rules which hinder the legal protection of individuals with re-
spect to their Community rights will have to be disapplied by
national courts. Second, it shows that the ECJ may, in order to
secure the uniform application of Community law, circumscribe
the conditions under which a specific remedy, in Factortame I and
Factortame II interim relief, must be applied by those courts. Fi-
nally, it makes clear that the national courts may, for reasons of
consistency, be ready to extend the legal protection given to in-
dividuals by virtue of Community law to individuals who are con-
fronted with similar impairments of their rights in a purely na-
tional situation.
II. THE HARMONIZATION OF TORT LAW
A. The Francovich and Brasserie Jurisprudence
The Community law requirement of effective judicial pro-
tection has led to another and even more important application
in the field of legal remedies that is of direct concern for our
subject. I am referring to the remedy of compensation for harm
caused to individuals by Member States which have breached
Community law. The first crucial step in that direction was
taken in the ECJ's Francovich decision of November 19, 1991,
where the principle of tort liability had been established in the
case of a Member State that had not implemented a directive at
all - provided that the directive intended to grant rights to indi-
viduals, that the contents of such rights could be determined on
the basis of the directive, and that there was a causal link be-
23. M. v. Home Office, [1993] 3 All ER 537, [1993] 3 W.L.R. 433 (H.L.).
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tween the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the breach.24 In
later judgments, such a principle of liability was confirmed and
applied in the situation of directives being transposed incom-
pletely or incorrectly.25 The second equally important step was
taken in the Brasserie judgment of March 5, 1996 where the
Court acknowledged the principle of Member State liability in
the event of breaches of directly effective EC Treaty provisions
by acts or omissions of the legislature of the Member State con-
cerned.26 Furthermore, the Court described in that judgment
the substantive conditions that must be satisfied for such liability
to be imposed. It did so with the help of rules which it found in
its case law relating to Article 215, paragraph 2, of the EC Treaty
with respect to legislative measures on the part of Community
institutions involving choices of economic policy,2 that is, in a
context characterized by the exercise of wide discretion. 28 As a
third step, the Court indicated in its Hedley Lomasjudgment that
the Francovich principle also applied to breaches of Community
law which were the consequence of an administrative decision
taken by a national administration.29
The consequence of this case law is that national courts will
have to disapply national rules that are incompatible with the
conditions which the ECJ, in the absence of rules given by the
Community legislator, has held to govern the liability of Member
States for breaches of Community law, "whatever be the organ of
the State whose act or omission was responsible for the
breach."3" Thus, national rules which make it impossible to in-
stitute an action in damages for breaches of Community law by
the national legislature proper or which make adequate com-
pensation of pure economic loss impossible, will have to be set
24. Francovich, [1991] E.C.R. at 5415-16, 11 38-42.
25. Wagner Miret, Case C-334/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6911; British Telecommunica-
tions, Case C-392/93, [1996] ECR 1-1631; Denkavit, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2827.
26. Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1029.
27. By referring to its case law regarding Article 215 of the EC Treaty which gov-
erns the extra-contractual liability for breaches of Community law on the part of Com-
munity institutions, the EC folowed the advice of Advocate-General Misho in his
Francovich II opinion to harmonize the two Community based liability systems,
Francovich I, and Article 215 of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 215, 2,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 710; see also Walter van Gerven, Bridging the Unbridgeable: Commu-
nity and National Tort-Laws afLer Francovich and Brasserie, [1996] IrN'L & CoMP. L.Q. 517.
28. Brasserie, [1996] E.C.R. at 1051-53, 41-45.
29. Case C-5/94, [1996] AJDA 489 96/1042.
.30. Brasserie, [1996] E.C.R. at 1042, 32.
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aside by national courts. Because of the basic character of the
substantive conditions that the ECJ has spelled out, and will be
asked to spell out even more so in the future,"' such disapplica-
tion may lead, in the field of Member State liability, to a rather
wide area of uniform application of tort rules between Member
States. This is particularly so with respect to the condition of
breach, where the Court has distinguished between situations of
breach simpliciter, as in Francovich, for which a form of strict lia-
bility will obtain, and situations characterized by the exercise of
wide discretion, as in Brasserie, to which it has applied the test of
manifest and grave disregard of the limits on the exercise of pub-
lic powers.3 2 The conditions of causation and of harm, includ-
ing the extent of compensation, are also concepts which the
Court has already begun to interpret in a uniform manner3 3 and
which it may be called upon to interpret further in future cases.
Moreover, it is not to be excluded that national courts, as in the
case of the remedy of interim relief, will for reasons of consis-
tency extend the ECJ's rulings regarding the remedy of compen-
sation to apply in purely national situations as well, for example,
to acknowledge the liability of the legislature proper for
breaches of constitutional rules or basic principles of national
law.
B. The Banks Situation
Obviously, all of the foregoing relates to the extra-contrac-
tual liability of Member States and, accordingly, of Community
institutions. The remaining question that is critical to this Essay
is, however, whether the ECJ will also consider that a remedy
should be made available in the national legal systems as an obli-
gation under Community law,3 4 for breaches committed by indi-
31. See Francovich, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-5614-15, 1 42-43. The expression "substan-
tive conditions", as opposed to "procedural conditions" which the ECJ used in para-
graph 43 of the Francovichjudgment seems to relate to both the conditions imposed by
the Court for liability to arise and those for determining the extent and kind of repara-
tion of loss and damage. Id. In Brasserie, the Court distinguishes further between the
conditions for liability to arise, the conditions under which reparation must be made,
and the extent to which it must be made. Brasserie, [1996] E.C.R. at 1037-66, 1067-73,
1081-90.
32. Brasserie, [1996] E.C.R. at 1053, 46; see also van Gerven, supra note 27, at 530.
33. See van Gerven, supra note 27, at 530.
34. That means as an obligation and not only as a possibility; when, and to the
extent that, the applicable national tort rules would allow such liability.
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viduals of directly enforceable obligations which Community law
imposes upon them. The classic examples are obligations im-
posed by Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty which prohibit en-
terprises from concluding cartel agreements or abusing a domi-
nant position. The question was raised before the ECJ in Banks
v. British Coal Corporation5 but was, for reasons particular to that
case, not answered by the Court in its opinion. If that question is
to be answered in the affirmative, as I think it should,16 then it
will be up to the ECJ, in the absence of Community legislation,
not only to acknowledge that principle, but als6, as it has done
for Member State liability, to lay down the substantive law provi-
sions which govern such tort liability between individuals, in .a
uniform way, throughout the Community. The harmonizing ef-
fect that ECJ case-law already has with respect to national laws on
Member State liability would then be extended to national laws
on torts committed by individuals.
C. Product Liability
ECJ case law may impact on national tort rules through the
elaboration of the substantive conditions of Community law
under which extra-contractual liability is to arise in the event of
breaches of Community legal rules by either Member States
through Francovich or Community institutions 7 and their civil
servants. As indicated before, the Court's boldness in interpret-
ing EC Treaty provisions and general principles when the judi-
cial protection of individuals is at stake, is in stark contrast with
the Court's cautious approach when it comes to interpreting
provisions of directives, at least of those which are not imple-
menting fundamental Community law concepts. Therefore, it
remains to be seen which role the ECJ will wish to play in the
interpretation of directive provisions, such as those provisions of
Council Directive 85/374 EEC ofJuly 25, 1985 on product liabil-
ity.a8 So far, I am not aware of any Court judgment interpreting
the wording of the Product Liability Directive. But, that may
change 9 taking into account the important concepts in the Di-
35. Case C-128/92, [1994) E.C.R. 1-1209.
36. See Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven, Banks, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-1212,
43.
37. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 215, 1 2, [1992] C.M.L.R. at 710.
38. Council Directive No. 85/374, OJ. L 210/29 (1985).
39. Lack of litigation at the level of the EJ is the normal consequence of lack of
19971 689
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rective relating to liability without fault 4° which may need clarifi-
cation, such as those regarding the conditions under which the
producer, importer, and supplier of a defective product may be
held jointly and severally liable,4' the definition of defective-
ness,42 and the kind of damage to be compensated,43 to name
only a few.44
Whether the Court, when given the opportunity, would ap-
ply more than a textual interpretation of the directive is doubt-
fu145 as will be seen hereafter.
D. The Harmonization of Contract Laws: Only through ECJ Case
Law Interpreting Directives
1. Reasons for a Lesser Impact in Contract Law than in the
Field of Tort Law
There are at least two reasons why the impact of ECJ case-
law on contract law will be less noteable than its impact on tort
law. The first is that the Court is not commissioned by the Com-
munity treaties, as it is with respect to non-contractual liability of
Community institutions and its civil servants, to develop rules on
contractual liability "in accordance with the general principles
common to the laws of the member-States."46 To the contrary,
matters of contractual liability of the Community-for which the
ECJ may have jurisdiction "pursuant to [an] arbitration clause
contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Com-
munity, whether that contract be governed by public or private
litigation in the courts of Member States. In the United Kingdom, the first Member
State to implement the Directive, the success of the Directive in terms of litigation
seems to have been rather low. JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LLABILrr 356 (1994).
40. Council Directive No. 85/374, supra note 38, art. 4, OJ. L 210/29, at 31
(1985).
41. Id. arts. 3, 5, O.J. L 210/29, at 30, 31 (1985).
42. Id. art. 6, OJ. L 210/29, at 31 (1985).
43. Id. art. 9, O.J. L 210/29, at 31 (1985).
44. A thorough investigation of the Product Liability Directive does not, however,
provide conclusive evidence that the limited no-fault scheme which the directive in-
troduces should serve as a model for similar situations, over-emphasizing, as it does, the
.supply of the product," related element in injuries, to the exclusion of other factors.
STAPLETON, supra note 39, at 342-43, 346.
45. See Ewoud Hondius, Produktaansprakejkheid: de voordelen van een dualistische
rechtsorde, 324/038 ARs AEQui (May 1996) (discussing need to use truly comparative law
approach).
46. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 215, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 710.
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law"47 -"shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract
in question."4" The Commission which is normally the con-
tracting party on behalf of the Community, could have tried to
agree with the other contracting parties to designate general
principles of contract law "common to the laws of the Member
States" as the law being applicable to the contract, leaving it to
the ECJ to find these principles.49 It has been its practice, in-
stead, to designate the national law of the Member State where
the contract is concluded. The second reason is that it is hard to
vizualize a situation where the ECJ would be led to establish and
define a principle of contractual liability for reasons of legal pro-
tection requiring an appropriate legal remedy, as it has done in
the Francovich and post-Francovich judgments for the non-con-
tractual liability of Member States. That would suppose, indeed,
that an individual plaintiff should be able, in order to secure
rights which he derives from Community law, to rely on the mis-
performance by a Member State under a contract which that
Member State has concluded with the Community and for
which, as said above, the ECJ has jurisdiction under an arbitra-
tion clause inserted in the contract which furthermore declares
the general principles of contract law common to the laws of the
Member States to be the law applicable to the contract. 50 It fol-
lows that the ECJ's role in the shaping of private contract law will
be limited to interpreting legal rules in the European treaties
and directives which relate to problems of contract law.
2. No EC Treaty-related Interpretation but only Directive-
Related Interpretation
When one looks through the registers of the ECJ's case law,
references to contract principles do not seem to be absent in-
cluding, for example, the duty to cooperate, the principles of
legal certainty and of legitimate expectations, the concepts of
force majeure, legitimate defense and reasonableness, the maxim
47. Id. art. 181, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 690.
48. Id. art. 215, 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 710.
49. See van Gerven, supra note 2, at 373-74.
50. That would be different only if Community rights were granted to individuals
by means of contracts concluded with Community institutions or with Member Sates to
the advantgae of Community institutions. In such a case, there might be room for the
requirement ofjudicial protection to impose an obligation on Member States to make
sufficiently uniform remedies available in the event of contractual misperformance.
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nemo auditur, and even abuse of rights. Looking up the relevant
judgments, one finds, however, that these principles either re-
late to international obligations of the Community, or to institu-
tional obligations between Member States or Community institu-
tions, or to principles of administrative law applicable to the
dealings of Community institutions with individual enterprises
or citizens.51 If the ECJ would have for task to find general prin-
ciples of contract law common to the laws of the member States,
such principles might possibly have been applied by analogy.
Because that is not the case though, those principles are of no
direct or indirect concern here.
Of course, the word "agreement," in the sense of a private
law contract concluded between undertakings, appears in Article
85 of the EC Treaty where it is used, within the framework of the
prohibition on cartels, in combination with the terms "decisions
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices."5" Ac-
cordingly, there is substantial ECJ and Court of First Instance
case law that defines the notion of agreement or contract in an
effort to delineate the scope of the prohibition of Article 85 and
to distinguish between "agreements" and "concerted practices."
The issues resolved concern the question of which forms of con-
sent between the contracting parties are to be deemed to be
agreements as opposed to concerted practices. The questions
arise, for example, in connection with exchanges of letters, cir-
cular letters, general conditions, so-called "gentlemen's agree-
ments", verbal agreements, and unilateral acts taken within the
framework of an agreement.53 The problem with these court in-
terpretations is that they are given, as they should be, in a con-
text of determining whether the agreement is restrictive of com-
petition. In other words, the interpretation is made with a view
51. In the Panagis Pafitisjudgment, at the request of the referring Greek court, the
notion of abuse of rights was considered by the JECJ in a private law context. Panagis
Pafitis, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1382-83, 67-70. Before the Greek court, the defendants had
put forward an argument based on Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code prohibiting
abuses of rights to the effect that it also precluded the abusive exercise of rights con-
ferred by Community law. The ECJ rejected that argument in obiter dictum and rea-
soned that to allow such a defense would undermine the uniform application and full
effect of Community law. Id. at 1-1382-83, 1 70. Because the referringjudge did not ask
the ECJ to address the question of whether there is a principle of Community law
prohibiting 'abuses' of Community rights, the ECJ did not examine that point.
52. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 1 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626.
53. See WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., KARTELRECHT VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAP
113, 12-36 (2d ed. 1997).
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to the aim which Article 85 pursues in the context of the EC
Treaty provisions on the establishment and maintenance of a
truly common market.54 For being a "functional" interpretation,
it cannot serve as a model when it comes to define the concepts
in the context of contract law in general.
Outside the EC Treaty, the notions of "contract" and "agree-
ment" also appear in the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters,55 more particularly in Article 5, section 1, on
special jurisdiction in matters relating to a contract and in Arti-
cle 17 on agreements and trust instruments conferring jurisdic-
tion.56 The interpretation of the Convention has been assigned
by a protocol agreed on by all Member States to the ECJ through
a system of preliminary rulings modeled after Article 177 of the
EC Treaty. Here again, however, the interpretation of the Con-
54. In my Opinion of October 10, 1989 in Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici SpA v.
Commission, Case C-277/87, [1990] E.C.R. 1-46, decided by judgment of January 11,
1990, [1990] E.C.R. 1-45, I tried to put the concept of agreement in Article 85 of the EC
Treaty into the wider perspective of the concept under contract law in general. The full
text of the Opinion, only exisiting in Dutch, and the judgment have not been published
in the European Court Reporter because of the decision at that time to publish some
judgments of chambers only in summary form. The Dutch version of the Opinion is
published, however, in HANDBOEK EG (KARTELRECHT) XIV 227 (R. Barents ed.) The
Opinion states:
It seems to me that the Commission is correct in regarding the invoices and
the clauses contained therein (such as the export prohibition clause, but also
the choice ofjurisdiction and the risk transfer clauses) as part of a global con-
tractual relationship. Such is fully in conformity with the present opinion con-
cerning the formation of contracts according to which the content of a con-
tractual relation is not to be derived exclusively from what the parties have
mutually consented to, but also from the social context within which the con-
sent is given and maintained. This means in concreto that, as of the coming
into existence of the contractual relationship (in writing or orally), it is no
longer necessary to justify the binding force thereof, for every and any one
point, by virtue of an explicit exchange of wills. Where one of the parties has
taken unilateral measures in the course of the contractual relationship of
which the other party has, had, or may reasonably be regarded to have had
notice, such measures may be held to govern the contractual relationship and,
therefore, to come within the concept of "agreement" in Article 85, if that
other party has not objected thereto and has, thus, acknowledged the binding
force thereof.
Id.
55. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, J.O. L 299/32 (1972), amended by OJ. L 304/77 (1978),
amended by OJ. L 338/1 (1982), amended by O.J. L 285/1 (1989) (subsequent citations
will be to the full text English version, at OJ. L 304/77 (1978)).
56. Id. art. 5 § 1, 17, O.J. L 304/77 at 79, 82 (1978).
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vention occurs in a specific context, this time of private interna-
tional law, which cannot serve as a model for the interpretation
of contract law in general. 7
It follows from the foregoing that the extent to which ECJ
case-law will have an impact on private law depends on whether
the interpretation which the ECJ gives to one or another of the
many EC directives which the Council has promulgated is suffi-
ciently far reaching. I do not believe that this will be the case, at
least not to the same extent as the impact we have ascertained
above with respect to tort liability for governmental acts or omis-
sions. I will try to explain why in the following and last section of
this Essay, using as an example the concept of good faith in Arti-
cle 3, paragraph 1, of Directive 93/13, the Unfair Consumer
Contract Terms Directive.58 Before doing that, however, I would
like to mention two points which indicate that expectations for a
creative jurisprudence should not be raised too high. The first is
that in the field of company law where a number of judgments
have been rendered by the ECJ regarding the interpretation of
one of the many company directives in force, all of these, includ-
ing the recent Pafitis-judgment referred to above, are illustra-
tions of how the Court strictly interprets the wording of the di-
rective provisions. 59 The second indication is to be found in the
57. See, e.g., Jakob Handte & Co., GmbH v. Traitements Mecano-chimiques des,,
Surfaces S.A. (TMCS), Case C-26/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-3967, 1-3993, 1 10 (holding that
the concept of obligations resulting from contract has to be construed in Article 5(1) as
autonomous concept in light of system and objectives of Convention, that is, as excep-
tion to general rule laid down in Article 2(1)). The ECJ decided that proceedings by a
sub-purchaser of goods against the manufacturer may not be regarded as contractual.
Id. at 1-3996, 21. With respect to Article 17, the Court said again that the concept of
an agreement conferring jurisdiction must be interpreted in an autonomous way and
that, because the relationship between a shareholder and a company is comparable to
that existing between the parties to a contract, a jurisdiction clause contained in the
articles of association of a company constitutes an agreement for the purpose of Article
17. See Powell Duffryn Pic v. Wolfgang Petereit, Case C-214/89, [1992] E.C.R. 1-1745, 1-
1774-75, 14-16. As for the EC Convention on the law applicable to contractual obli-
gations, no jurisdiction to interpret the Convention has been given, as yet, to the ECJ.
The two protocols, 89/128 and 89/129, of December 17, 1988, published in [1989] O.J.
L 48/1 and 48/17, which have been agreed on to that effect have not yet been ratified
by a sufficient number of Member States to enter into force.
58. Council Directive No. 93/13, OJ. L 95/29 (1993).
59. One exception is the Marleasingjudgment, but only insofar as it relates to the
principle of directive conform interpretation which is a principle based on the interpre-
tation of EC Treaty provisions. See van Gerven, supra note 2, at 371. Some of the
judgments are merely applications of the principle of non-discrimination in the field of
company law.
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Court's case law concerning consumer directives where the
Court, as shown in the Criminal Proceedings against Patrice Di
Pinto6 ° judgment, also follows a restrictive approach based on
the aim and the wording of the directive. In that judgment, the
term consumer in Article 2 of Council Directive 85/577 of De-
cember 20, 198561 was strictly interpreted contrary to the Com-
mission's position before the Court.62
3. An Example: the Interpretation of "Good Faith" in the
Unfair Consumer Contract Terms Directive
Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Unfair Consumer Contract
Terms Directive" regards a non-individually negotiated contrac-
tual term as unfair "if, contrary to the requirement of good faith,
it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obliga-
tions arising under the contract, to the detriment of the con-
sumer." '4 Let us assume that the ECJ is requested to interpret
that provision: how would it proceed? Allow me to give a tenta-
tive answer, after having first made a few general observations
based on three legal writings, choosen at random among un-
doubtedly. many others, concerning the technique of compara-
tive law as used in the interpretation of Community law.
As pointed out by the former President of the ECJ, Profes-
sor Mertens de Wilmars, in an article published in 1991,65 it is
characteristic in general for the ECJ when it interprets Commu-
nity law to look for the proper meaning of Community concepts
and rules as distinguished from the meaning which the same
term may have in the domestic laws of Member States. That
does not mean that the Court does not look for concepts or
principles which are common to the laws of Member States-as
it is explicitly requested to do by Article 215, paragraph 2, of the
60. Case C-361/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1189.
61. Council Directive No. 85/577, O.J. L 372/31 (1985).
62. Di Pinto, [1991] E.C.R. at 1210-11, 14-19.
63. Council Directive No. 93/13, supra note 58, art. 3, 1 1, O.J. L 95/29, at 31
(1993).
64. In the Annex of the Directive, there is a list of examples of unfair contract
terms which are not binding. They are an illustration of the unwillingness of the Coun-
cil towards a greater harmonization of contract law, even in the field of consumer con-
tracts, particularly when compared with the earlier drafts of the directive.
See WILHEMSSON, supra note 4, at 93.
65. Mertens de Wilmars, Le droit compari dans lajurisprudence de la Cour dejustice des
Communauts Europ&nnes, [ 1991] JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUx 37-40.
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EC Treaty 66 but is also doing in other instances 7-in the na-
tional legal materials, which it does with the help of its research
department. It uses these materials, however, as a "riche arse-
nal" of concepts and rules from which it may derive a common,
but often the smallest common, denominator in order to sup-
port the interpretation of Community law which it deems to be
appropriate. In a recent article on comparative law and the
Courts,68 former ECJ judge and current Hoge Raad Advocate-
General Koopmans, gives some examples in AM & S Europe Lim-
ited v. Commission of the European Communities,69 in which the ECJ
used comparative legal materials drawn from the national laws to
find general principles of Community law. He then gives a few
examples drawn from the case law of the Hoge Raad to illustrate
how national courts use comparative legal materials, "to find, a
solution to the problem they are faced with" or "to justify a solu-
tion arrived at on different grounds."70 In another recent arti-
cle,71 Professor Ewoud Hondius emphasizes the necessity for na-
tional courts to take account of judgments rendered in other
Member States in relation to national laws implementing Com-
munity law provisions, in that case the Product Liability Direc-
tive,72 and points out that because the methods of interpretation
of Community law based national laws are somewhat different 73
from those used with respect to "purely national law," it is neces-
sary that the national or European origin of the provisions con-
cerned be indicated in consolidated, national codifications.
What appears from these considerations is that there are dif-
ferences in the use of comparative legal materials by European
and national courts, depending on whether the comparison is
effected vertically, that is, as between Community and national
66. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 215, 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.I. at 710.
67. The Court follows the same approach in other fields as well. See Brasserie,
[1996] E.C.R. at 1144, 27.
68. Thymen Koopmans, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Com-
munities, [1996] INr'L & COMP. L.Q. 825.
69. Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. at 1575.
70. van Gerven, supra note 27, at 550. Further in his article, Koopmans refers to
Lord Goifs use of comparative materials in the House of Lords decision in White v.
Jones, [1995] 1 All E.R. 691 (H.L. 1995).
71. See Hondius, supra note 45.
72. Council Directive No. 85/374, supra note 38.
73. I would think myself "very different" because of the determination of the ECJ,
as indicated above, to attach a proper Community law meaning to Community law pro-
visions.
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legal systems, 74 or horizontally, that is, between national legal sys-
tems outside the field of Community law, or between European
legal systems, such as EC and European Commission of Human
Rights law. When used vertically, national comparative materials
are used in function of Community law, that is, they are taken as
a model not on the basis of their own intrinsic merits but be-
cause they are seen as useful building stones to construe Com-
munity law appropriately.
Let us now, in light of the foregoing, consider the "good
faith" requirement in Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Unfair Con-
sumer Contract Terms directive. 75  To find the appropriate
meaning of Community law pursuant to the aim of the directive,
the quest for interpretation must start with the reading of Article
3 and the Preamble in as many language versions as possible.
From the text of Article 3, it is unclear whether the requirement
of good faith constitutes a condition which comes in addition to
that of a significant imbalance, or whether it aims only to put the
latter condition in a wider perspective. I would opt myself for
the latter taking into account the Preamble, where the require-
ment of good faith is said to amount to "an overall evaluation of
the interests involved" and where it is specified that "in making
an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the
strength of the bargaining position of the parties, whether the
consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether
the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order
of the consumer," all factors, it would seem, which allow to find
out whether the contract may have given rise to "a significant
imbalance ... to the detriment of the consumer."76 After which
the Preamble adds, rather mysteriously, "whereas the require-
ment of good faith may (sic) be satisfied by the seller or supplier
where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose
legitimate interests he has to take into account",7 7 adding, so to
speak, a flavor of reasonabless to the requirement.
74. It is vertical because one of the legal systems compared is situated at a higher
level than, and takes precedence over, the other. When referring to comparative law
herein, we mean only external, not internal, comparative law. See van Gerven, supra
note 27, at 540 (discussing distinction between external and internal comparative law).
75. Council Directive No. 93/13, supra note 58, art. 3, 1 1, O.J. L 95/29, at 31
(1993).
76. Id. art. 3, 1, O.J. L 95/29, at 31 (1993).
77. Id. pmbl., O.J. L 95/29 at 29 (1993).
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I wonder whether the ECJ or its Advocate-General, having
read Article 3 and the preamble of the Directive, would go any
further; that is, whether they would request the research depart-
ment of the Court to spend time and money on a comparative
study of the "good faith" requirement in the legal systems of all
of the Member States. From legal writings available on the mar-
ket, it is sufficiently known that the meanings attached to good
faith vary from one extreme to another,78 and that it will be diffi-
cult to find anything other than the smallest common denomi-
nator, namely that any contracting party must be reasonable
when performing a contract. In the words of the directive's pre-
amble, each contracting party should "take into account the le-
gitimate interests" of the other. A more thorough investigation
would certainly be helpful, as Advocate General Koopmans sug-
gested, to justify, not to find, the solution which the Court would
find in the first place in the meaning which the concept must
have in that specific Community directive.
78. Under Dutch and Belgian law, three different functions are assigned to the
concept of good faith in relation to the text of a contract: the interpretative, the sup-
plementing, and the derogating function. Under English and Scandinavian law, the
requirement of good faith is said not to be part of contract law. See Jack Beatson &
Daniel Friedmann, Introduction: "From 'Classical' to Modern Contract law", in GOOD FAiTH
AND FAULT IN CoNTRAcr LAw 14-15 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (stat-
ing that it appears that English law, nevertheless, offers specific solutions to a wide
range of issues that involve question of unfairness).
